Commit ca08234a authored by David Sinquin's avatar David Sinquin

login handler: Use constant-time comparaison for hashes.

An attacker knowing the salt but not the hash could try timming-attacks
to guess a password hash and then try to find it from the hash.
Although not a high risk, there is no good reason not to use a
constant-time comparison, hence this commit.
parent 3244a46d
......@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import os
from base64 import encodestring, decodestring, b64encode, b64decode
from collections import OrderedDict
from django.contrib.auth import hashers
from hmac import compare_digest as constant_time_compare
......@@ -63,12 +64,7 @@ def checkPassword(challenge_password, password):
salt = challenge_bytes[DIGEST_LEN:]
hr = hashlib.sha1(password.encode())
valid_password = True
# La comparaison est volontairement en temps constant
# (pour éviter les timing-attacks)
for i, j in zip(digest, hr.digest()):
valid_password &= i == j
return valid_password
return constant_time_compare(digest, hr.digest())
def hash_password_salt(hashed_password):
......@@ -118,7 +114,8 @@ class CryptPasswordHasher(hashers.BasePasswordHasher):
assert encoded.startswith(self.algorithm)
salt = hash_password_salt(challenge_password)
return crypt.crypt(password.encode(), salt) == challenge.encode()
return constant_time_compare(crypt.crypt(password.encode(), salt),
def safe_summary(self, encoded):
......@@ -159,7 +156,9 @@ class MD5PasswordHasher(hashers.BasePasswordHasher):
assert encoded.startswith(self.algorithm)
salt = hash_password_salt(encoded)
return b64encode(hashlib.md5(password.encode() + salt).digest() + salt) == encoded.encode()
return constant_time_compare(
b64encode(hashlib.md5(password.encode() + salt).digest() + salt),
def safe_summary(self, encoded):
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